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(When) Do Critical Life Events Push People to the Populist Radical 
Right? Support for the Swiss People’s Party Following Relationship  
Dissolution, Unemployment or a Health Crisis
Marieke Voorpostel*, Ursina Kuhn*, and Gian-Andrea Monsch*
Abstract: Using the Swiss Household Panel, we examine whether experiencing relationship 
dissolution, unemployment, or a health crisis increases support for the Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP).  Fixed effects models shows this to be the case. Changes in financial resources, atti-
tudes or trust in the government cannot explain this effect.  Finally, we test whether increased 
support for the SVP following these events is more likely among individuals with lower trust 
and income levels and with views similar of those of the SVP.  We find that individuals with 
traditional gender values are more likely to support the SVP after separation. 
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(Quand) les événements critiques de la vie poussent-ils les gens vers la droite popu-
liste ? Soutien à l’UDC à la suite de la séparation, du chômage ou d’une crise de santé
Résumé : À l’aide du Panel suisse de ménages, nous examinons si une séparation, le chômage 
ou une crise de santé augmentent le soutien au Parti union démocratique du centre (UDC). 
Les modèles à effets fixes montrent que c’est le cas. Les changements dans les ressources finan-
cières, les attitudes ou la confiance dans le gouvernement ne peuvent expliquer cet effet. Enfin, 
nous vérifions si un soutien accru à l’UDC suivant un évènement est plus probable chez les 
personnes ayant des niveaux de confiance et de revenu plus faibles et des opinions similaires 
à celles de l’UDC. Nous constatons que les personnes ayant des valeurs traditionnelles de 
genre sont plus susceptibles de soutenir l’UDC après une séparation. 
Mots-clés : événements de vie critiques, droite populiste, préférence partisane, données du panel
(Wann) drängen kritische Lebensereignisse Menschen zu den populistischen Parteien? 
Unterstützung der SVP nach Trennung, Arbeitslosigkeit oder Gesundheits krise
Zusammenfassung: Mit dem Schweizer Haushalt-Panel untersuchen wir, ob eine Trennung, 
Arbeitslosigkeit oder eine Gesundheitskrise die Unterstützung für die Schweizerische Volks-
partei (SVP) erhöht. Fixed Effects Modelle zeigen, dass dies der Fall ist. Veränderungen der 
finanziellen Ressourcen, der Einstellungen oder des Vertrauens in die Regierung können 
diesen Effekt nicht erklären. Schliesslich testen wir, ob eine verstärkte Unterstützung für die 
SVP bei Personen mit geringerem Vertrauens- und Einkommensniveau und mit ähnlichen 
Ansichten wie die SVP wahrscheinlicher ist. Wir stellen fest, dass Personen mit traditionellen 
Geschlechterwerten die SVP nach der Trennung eher unterstützen. 
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1 Introduction
Critical life events, such as a relationship dissolution, loss of a job or a health crisis, 
have profound consequences in many life domains. They are often accompanied 
by a loss in resources and increased stress levels and may change future prospects 
and expectations. As a result, they may translate into changed views on society and 
the role of the government, with the potential to affect political party preferences. 
Previous research has demonstrated that relationship dissolution affects po-
litical party preference in Switzerland. Based on longitudinal data from the Swiss 
Household Panel, Voorpostel and colleagues (2018) showed that separation increased 
the likelihood to support the populist right Swiss People’s Party (SVP). This find-
ing was contrary to the anticipated shift to the left following separation (Chapman 
1985; Fahs 2007; Smith 2007; Wilson and Lusztig 2004); with decreasing financial 
resources and often increased need for support such as childcare, separation was 
thought to increase support for left-wing parties. Our study expands on previous 
work on the association between life events and support for the populist right by 
assessing multiple life events, namely separation, unemployment and a health crisis. 
The literature on voting behaviour provides many explanations for the sup-
port of populist right parties (Arzheimer 2011; Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Oesch 
2008). Studies that looked at populist right party support on the individual level 
have shown that losers of globalisation (economic dimension), individuals with 
xenophobic and inward looking attitudes (cultural dimension) and citizens with 
low levels of trust in the political establishment (political dimension) are relatively 
more likely to vote for the radical populist right. We test whether these arguments 
explain increased support for the SVP following critical life events. A critical life 
event may decrease financial security, change life prospects and produce uncertainty, 
through which it may affect each of these three dimensions. We argue that these 
changes make individuals more likely to recognize themselves in the discourse of 
the SVP promoting an exclusionist view on society, as well as a firm stance against 
immigration and European integration (Bernhard 2017; Betz 1994), and eventu-
ally result in increased support for this party. Finally, we examine whether increased 
support for the SVP following a critical life event may be especially likely among 
individuals with lower income levels and those who already are close or in line with 
the views of the SVP prior to the event. 
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2 Theoretical background
2.1 The Swiss People’s Party, populist radical right wing party support and volatility 
in political party preference
Populist radical right parties have a common ideology based on nativism, authori-
tarianism and populism (Mudde 2007). The SVP is part of this party family that 
has gained substantial electoral support over the last decades in Switzerland and 
in Western democracies in general (Bernard 2017). The SVP has evolved from a 
conservative agrarian party to a radical right and increasingly authoritarian party 
(McGann and Kitschelt 2005). The SVP strongly opposes immigration and European 
integration and advocates traditional gender roles. Although the SVP is the largest 
party in Switzerland (with a vote share of 26 per cent in 2019) and part of the Swiss 
federal government, with its populist discourse it presents itself and is perceived as 
an opposition party rather than as a part of the political establishment. 
Explaining support for the populist radical right in general and for the SVP 
in particular does not differ from explaining support for other parties (Arzheimer 
2018) and is based on the idea that political preferences are replacing class and re-
ligious cleavages (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012, 10). This shift from social structure 
to individual preferences proposes three explanations for support for the populist 
radical right: an economic, cultural and political explanation. 
The economic explanation argues that the so-called “losers of globalisation” who 
are confronted with wage pressure and competition over welfare benefits are attracted 
by populist radical right parties who have endorsed a protectionist stance and fight 
European and other forms of economic integration (Borschnier and Kriesi 2012; 
McGann and Kitschelt 2005). The empirical evidence shows that typical populist 
radical right wing voters are predominantly low educated young men belonging 
to the working or lower middle class or who are unemployed (Arzheimer 2011). 
Besides economic protectionism, the political agenda of these parties also conveys a 
shelter for the “homeland culture”. This is the cultural explanation for the electoral 
success of populist radical right parties when they portray immigration and further 
European integration as a threat to national identity, security and the welfare state 
(Amengay and Stockemer 2018; Rydgren 2007; Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Oesch 
2008). Xenophobic attitudes, especially anti-immigrant sentiments, have proven to 
be a crucial explanation of populist radical right voting (Arzheimer 2011). Finally, 
according to the political explanation put forward to explain the success of the 
populist radical right, citizens who are dissatisfied with the state of democracy in 
their country are sensitive to an anti-elite discourse challenging mainstream parties 
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Oesch 2008). These three explanations are related to 
each other. As Betz (1994) has already argued two decades ago, radical social and 
economic transformations generate feelings of anxiety, disenchantments and resent-
ment within the most vulnerable segments of society (economic explanation). The 
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populist radical right has succeeded in mobilizing these social groups by pointing 
to the unresponsiveness of the political establishment (political explanation) and 
by identifying immigrants as scapegoats (cultural explanation). 
The cultural explanation has proven to be the most important one for populist 
radical right voting in Switzerland, but also in other Western European countries 
(Arzheimer 2011; Lubbers and Coenders 2017). In Switzerland, exclusionist views, 
such as protection of the national identity against outsiders (Oesch 2008, 349), 
anti-universalistic cultural preferences (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012, 28) or generally 
negative attitudes towards immigration (Ackermann et al. 2018, 553–554), have 
been found to be strongly correlated with support for the populist radical right. 
Our study focuses on a change in preference for the SVP, which implies that 
we assess volatility in party preference. As individual preferences have become 
more central to political party choice, volatility in party preference has increased. 
Although studies have shown that most voters have stable party preferences (Kuhn 
2016; Plutzer 2002; Prior 2010), a significant minority of voters change their party 
preference over time (Nicolet and Sciarini 2006). This volatility is not random; 
rather, voters tend to change between parties that are closely aligned (Kuhn 2009; 
Van der Meer et al. 2015). The literature suggests several drivers of volatility in po-
litical party preference. A number of these drivers reflect individual circumstances 
and attitudes, such as changes in a person’s financial situation (Sanders and Brynin 
1999), changes in attitudes and values or in salience of these values (Aarts and 
Thomassen 2008) and decreased trust in political parties and in democracy (Dalton 
and Weldon 2005; Dassonneville 2012). We argue that these drivers of volatility 
become salient in the face of critical life events and may lead to changes in political 
party preferences. The direction in which they change is expected to increase the 
likelihood of supporting the SVP. 
2.2 Literature review: critical life events and populist radical right voting
Our study focuses on three critical life events: relationship dissolution, unemploy-
ment and serious health problems. A commonality of these events is that they tend 
to have negative consequences in multiple life domains. They are discrete events 
that negatively affect health and well-being, increase stress levels and are the events 
typically included in studies on these outcomes (Luhmann et al. 2012). As such, 
these events may profoundly change one’s views of the world and one’s place in it 
(Janoff-Bulman 1999) and, as a result, have the potential to affect political party 
preferences.1 
1 Another negative life event often studied is bereavement. We tested the effects of a household 
member or a close person’s death but did not include bereavement into the analysis because its 
consequences on various life domains are less direct. We did not find any effect on party prefer-
ences.
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While some US studies have demonstrated that a link exists between negative feelings 
and populist radical right support for entire life trajectories (Cramer 2016; Hochs-
child 2016), only a few studies have directly linked life events to vote intention for 
the populist radical right at the individual level. In their study on the link between 
relationship dissolution and political party preference, Voorpostel and colleagues 
(2018) showed that this type of critical life event has a small but significant effect 
on party preference, showing, in particular, an increase in support for the SVP. 
However, a study based on data from the UK showed no effect of this event on 
party preference (Kern 2010).
The relationship between the event of unemployment and populist radical 
right voting has received more research attention. Many studies on the relationship 
between unemployment and populist radical right voting show that unemployment 
and job insecurity are associated with increased support for the populist radical 
right, both in cross-sectional (Corbetta and Colocca 2013) and longitudinal studies 
(Geishecker and Siedler 2011; Rink et al. 2008). However, some studies have found 
no relationship (Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006) or only for individuals with high levels 
of political interest (Kohler 2002). Others have demonstrated that negative work 
experiences lead to political alienation rather than to right-wing voting (Schraff 2019).
The study of health impediments and political attitudes and behaviour has 
received little attention. Schur and Adya (2013) showed with US data that people 
with disabilities tend to favour more government involvement in employment and 
healthcare but also are more critical of government responsiveness and trustworthi-
ness. It remains to be seen to what extent these findings translate to health crises 
more generally in the Swiss context. 
2.3 Linking critical life events to increased support for the SVP
What is it about these life events that could make the populist radical right more 
attractive to those who experience them? In contemporary society in which re-
sponsibility for success or failure is increasingly individualized, fear and insecurity 
associated with these events may translate into resentment for perceived ‘enemies’ 
such as immigrants but also mainstream politics (Salmela and Von Scheve 2017). 
Betz’ (1994; 2005) prominent theory on the emotion of resentment suggests that 
support for populist right wing parties mainly comes from those who experience 
insecurity about their identity, work and entire life; fear the loss of social cohesion 
and traditional social bonds; or experience distrust in politics and democracy. The 
experience of critical life events with significant negative consequences could be 
important drivers of such feelings of alienation, insecurity and distrust and be related 
to the main factors explaining voting for the populist radical right.
With regard to the economic explanation of populist radical right voting, it 
has been well-established that the three life events in this study all tend to be ac-
companied by a drop in income, which may lead to financial difficulties (Batavia 
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and Beaulaurier 2001; Brand 2015; Schofield et al. 2010; Vaus et al. 2017). One’s 
financial situation may affect political orientations, such as views on the role of the 
welfare state (Andersen and Curtis 2014). 
The cultural explanation for populist radical right voting focuses on attitudes. 
A number of psychological studies have demonstrated a relationship between life 
events and changes in attitudes (Bardi et al. 2009). The theoretical approach behind 
these studies focuses on the role that uncertainty plays and states that unexpected 
events lead to the need for affirmation of beliefs (Heine et al. 2006). Based on lon-
gitudinal data from the US, Randles and colleagues (2017) showed that the experi-
ence of events such as bereavement, relationship dissolution or financial difficulties 
increased a preference for conservative perspectives, as well as made people more 
polarized in existing beliefs. Hatemi (2013) found that individuals who suffered 
an economic risk event (e. g., major financial problems, unemployment, divorce or 
separation) were less supportive of immigration. Individuals who face deteriorating 
circumstances following critical life events may feel more vulnerable and hence may 
buy into the SVP’s narrative on immigration and social spending.
With regard to attitudes, we also consider views on gender as the SVP advo-
cates traditional gender roles. According to their view, mothers of young children 
should not be in the labour force and the state should not spend money on childcare, 
which is seen as a private responsibility. In this sense, it deviates from a number of 
successful far-right European populist parties that have embraced more progressive 
values (Duina and Carson 2019). As relationship dissolution, unemployment and 
serious health problems all likely affect the division of labour in the household, these 
events may also shift attitudes on gender roles towards the attitudes of the SVP. 
Little is known about whether critical life events decrease trust in government, 
which captures the political explanation for populist radical right support (Billiet and 
de Witte 1995; Hooghe et al. 2011). All three events are likely to increase contact 
with and dependence on public authorities and services, which have the potential 
to affect the trust people place in the government in general.
In sum, the experience of each of these three critical life events may affect 
financial resources, lower confidence in the government and change citizens’ at-
titudes closer to the positions held by the SVP. While there is some evidence that 
all three life events decrease political engagement in general (Voorpostel and Coffé 
2012; Schraff 2019; Schur and Adya 2013), a switch to the SVP is a theoretically 
plausible alternative. 
2.4 Our study
We examine the relationship between critical life events and SVP voting in three steps. 
First, we check whether such a relationship exists: are individuals who experienced 
one of the three events more likely to support the SVP after the event? In an effort 
to explain this relationship, we explore in a second step the extent to which changes 
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in the aforementioned explanatory factors of income, attitudes and trust associated 
with these events explain the relationship between life events and SVP preference. 
Finally, the same life event may have very different effects on different people; the 
lack of resources to cope with critical life events, especially for those from lower 
socio-economic classes, may make experiencing them all the more stressful, fuelling 
feelings of threat and marginalisation (Bjørklund 2007). This, in turn, may increase 
support for populist right wing parties particularly among the lower income group. 
Also, it may not be very likely that individuals who are positioned far away from the 
radical right electorate in terms of attitudes, would change their views so dramatically 
following a life event and express a preference for the SVP. More likely, individuals 
already aligned with the views of the populist radical right may be the most likely 
to support the SVP following a life event. Additionally, individuals with lower levels 
of trust prior to the event may be more likely to prefer the populist radical right 
after. Hence, in a final step we will assess whether the increased support for the 
SVP is especially likely to occur among individuals with fewer financial resources, 
individuals with views already closer aligned with the SVP’s programme and those 
with lower levels of trust prior to the event. 
3 Data and method
3.1 Data and sample selection
We use data from the three main SHP samples (which started in 1999, 2004 and 
2013) and the supplementary sample for the canton of Vaud that started in 2013.2 
Because political variables and gender attitudes have not been collected in all sur-
vey years, the analysis is restricted to the years 2002–2009, 2011, 2014 and 2017. 
The selection of the years has impacts on the results. The effect is strongest in the 
period before 2015, which is the year the SVP reached its best electoral result so 
far (29.4 % in the national election) and was again represented with two seats in 
the federal council.3
We do not use survey weights because the standard weights do not correct 
bias for political variables. Moreover, by excluding foreigners and young individuals 
(who have no right to vote), we analyse a specific sub-group of the SHP sample. In 
addition, we selected for each event a treatment group (those who experienced the 
event during the period of observation) and a control group of individuals who did 
not experience the event but were at risk of the event occurring.
Regarding the separation variable, the control group refers to partnered indi-
viduals who have cohabited (either married or unmarried) for at least two years. The 
2 In total, we had 44,026 observations (person-years) from SHP I (or 62%), 18,818 from SHP II 
(or 26%), 44,026 from SHP III (or 10%) and 1,353 SHP VD (or 2%).
3 The limited number of events does not allow us to analyse different time periods separately.
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treatment group consists of individuals who have become separated since the last 
time they were observed. These individuals are kept in the sample as long as they 
remain separated (n=2,254 for the survey years with political and gender variables).
For unemployment, we consider respondents in the main working-age range 
(25 to 64 years). The control group consists of working individuals who do not 
report unemployment. The treatment group (n=562 for the survey years with politi-
cal and gender variables) consists of individuals who transitioned from working to 
unemployment since the last time they were observed. They remain in the treatment 
group as long as they remained unemployed. 
For health crises, we consider respondents in the main working-age range (25 
to 64 years). The control group includes economically active individuals (working 
or unemployed). The treatment group consists of individuals who stopped working 
in the last 5 years and name health problems as the reason for not working (n=479 
for the years that included political and gender variables), independently of whether 
they are currently working, unemployed or inactive.
3.2 Measures
3.2.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is vote intention for the SVP. Vote intention was determined 
by asking the (open) question, which party respondents would vote for if elections for 
the National Council were held tomorrow. Respondents who express a vote intention 
for the SVP are coded 1. Respondents who intend to vote for another party, have no 
vote intention, do not know their intention or vote for a candidate not for a party 
are coded as 0. Respondents who refuse to answer the question are excluded from 
the analysis. Because our dependent variable groups together preferences for other 
parties with having no preference, our results do not distinguish between voters 
intending a shift from a different party to the SVP and newly mobilized voters for 
the SVP. However, the results remain the same if we exclude respondents without 
a party preference from the analysis.
3.2.2 Independent variables
The main independent variable of interest is the binary event variable indicating 
whether the event occurred (treatment group) or not (control group) as described in 
section 3.1. The same person may have experienced multiple events or the same event 
multiple times. In these cases, every occurrence is included in the treatment group. 
We include also the main variables that should explain SVP support. Economic 
resources are measured by disposable household income, and missing values have 
been imputed. We include a linear variable referring to the income percentile of each 
year.4 We also include measures for political attitudes for both the economic (social 
4 Our findings are consistent with various alternative income measures (absolute values, logarithm, 
income quintile, personal income and satisfaction with income).
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spending) and cultural dimensions (xenophobia). For the Confederation’s social 
spending, we distinguish between individuals who are in favour of a diminution, 
individuals who are in favour of an increase and individuals who favour neither. For 
xenophobia, we distinguish between individuals who are in favour of Switzerland 
offering Swiss citizens better opportunities than foreigners, and individuals who se-
lected one of the two other alternatives: in favour of equal opportunities or favouring 
neither category. Gender attitudes are measured by agreement to two statements on 
a scale of 0 to 10: “A pre-school child suffers if his or her mother works for pay” and 
“to have a job is the best guarantee for a woman as for a man to be independent”. 
These commonly used items measure the attitude toward traditional gender roles 
legitimacy in society. The political explanation for populist radical right support is 
captured by questions on trust in the Federal Council (0-10). 
3.2.3 Control variables 
Using fixed-effects models, all time-invariant characteristics (e. g., cohort, educa-
tion, gender) cannot bias the coefficients and are not part of the model. We include 
age and period effects as controls. Electoral campaigns have an effect on volatility 
(Kuhn 2016, 170 ff). The closer elections are, the more likely citizens are to change 
from no party preference to a preference for a party (activation effect) and the more 
likely they are to switch from one party to another (persuasion effect). Support for 
the SVP is significantly higher in the years of national elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 
2011, 2015) than in other years. We therefore measure period effects by including 
an indicator for election years.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables included in our mod-
els. We show descriptive statistics for Swiss citizens 18 years of age and above and 
survey years that include political variables. The analytical sample varies slightly 
between the events studied. The analysis on unemployment and health crisis cover 
only the main working years (25–64 years) and exclude inactive individuals (e. g. 
homemakers). The separation sample excludes individuals who have never lived 
with a partner during the panel study. The mean values of the variables therefore 
vary slightly between the different samples.
3.3 Methods of analysis
We first compare, for the three events separately, observations from individuals 
after they experienced the event with observations from before the event and from 
individuals who did not experience the event with respect to the likelihood of sup-
porting the SVP. This cross-sectional approach serves as a reference before we test 
our hypotheses using a longitudinal approach.
We apply fixed-effects regression models to test our hypotheses. We use the linear 
probability model to estimate the fixed-effects models but check the robustness of our 
findings using nonlinear logistic regression. The main advantage of this longitudinal 
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approach is the identification of causal effects because we can rule out that selection 
into the event drives the results. In the first step, we ran a fixed-effects model for 
each event that controlled for age and election year, to test to what extent critical 
life events increase the probability of supporting the SVP. In the second step, we 
ran fixed-effects models that controlled for income, political and gender attitudes 
and political trust, to test whether changes in these variables had mediating effects. 
We use the same sub-sample for both analyses so that we can compare coefficients 
between models. If the regression coefficient of life events declines once the mediating 
variables are controlled in the model, we can conclude that these variables (income, 
attitudes and trust) are part of the mechanisms linking critical life events and popu-
list votes. In the third step, we interact the life events with income and attitudes to 
test for cumulative effects. To avoid the arbitrary dichotomous distinction of results 
according to p-values, we focus on the effect size to interpret regression coefficients. 
We discuss effect sizes, direction of the effects and the plausibility of rejecting the 
zero-hypothesis for all effects whose p-values are lower than 0.1.5 
4 Results
We first look at vote intention for the SVP by event from a cross-sectional perspec-
tive. Table 2 compares observations from individuals who experienced the event with 
5 When applying a p-value of 5%, the significance of effects depends on small coding decisions. 
When focusing on effect sizes, such arbitrary choices do not affect the conclusions.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sample
min max N Mean St. Dev
SVP 0 1 49 258 0.121 0.326
Separation 0 1 49 659 0.012 0.107
Unemployment 0 1 42 809 0.013 0.114
Health crisis 0 1 42 401 0.017 0.131
Age 18 97 49 659 51.242 14.147
Election year 0 1 49 659 0.238 0.426
Lowest income quintile 0 1 49 629 0.140 0.347
Less social expenses 0 1 45 974 0.220 0.414
More social expenses 0 1 45 974 0.359 0.480
Better chances for Swiss 0 1 45 974 0.300 0.458
Job important for independence 0 10 46 057 8.171 2.331
Children suffer with working mother 0 10 45 434 5.576 3.213
Trust in Government 0 10 45 985 5.670 2.076
Source: SHP (2002-2009, 2011,2014,2017). The descriptive statistics of the control variables are based on 
the separation sample.
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observations from individuals who did not or have not yet experienced the event. 
The difference is only significant for separation. Separated individuals are less likely 
to support the SVP than partnered individuals, which is in line with results from 
previous cross-sectional studies. Unemployment and health crisis have no significant 
relationship with vote intention for the SVP. These results confirm that life events 
are not important factors to explain support for populist radical right parties from 
a cross-sectional perspective.
To test an intra-individual change in SVP preference, we look at the results of our 
fixed-effects models (Table 3). With models 1, 3 and 5, we test whether experiencing 
one of the events raises the propensity for right-wing party support. These models 
include only basic control variables (age and election year) that are clearly exog-
enous to the event. We find that all three events increase support for the SVP by 2 
to 3 percentage points. For the health crisis, although the coefficient is of similar 
magnitude, it reaches significance only at the 10% level. 
These results do not show why we found such an effect. Therefore, we evaluate 
whether the main explanations for right-wing support mediate this effect. Models 2, 
4 and 6 include political and gender attitudes, trust in government and income. In 
line with research on right-wing support, political attitudes are the most important 
predictor. Moreover, being in favour of fewer social expenses is as important as 
xenophobia. Gender values do not explain SVP support. Trust in government has a 
small effect on SVP preference. An income change does not seem to influence vote 
intention for the SVP. Contrary to our expectations, the coefficients of the event 
variables are unaffected by the inclusion of these supplementary variables. Hence, 
these events do not produce a drop in resources, changing issue opinion or a decrease 
in political trust that would explain why voters are more likely to support the SVP 
following a critical life event. 
Table 2 Cross sectional results: vote intention for the SVP by event
no event/ 
before event 
after event total p-value
Separation % 12.3 8.9 12.1 0.000
n 41,966 2,152 44,118
Unemployment % 11.4 10.2 11.4 0.166
n 37,795 519 38,314
Health crisis % 11.4 13.8 11.4 0.282
n 37,693 441 38,134 
Note: significance of the difference is tested by pooled logistic regression controlling for clustering within 
persons. Source: SHP (2002–2009, 2011, 2014, 2017)
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The coefficients in models 2, 4 and 6 also allow us to interpret the size of the effect. 
Although an effect of 2 to 3 per cent seems modest, our model shows that the effect 
of the critical event is comparable to the effect of known explanations of populist 
radical right voting, such as xenophobia. Also, given that the overall probability 
to support the SVP amounts to only 12 per cent, an increase of 2 to 3 per cent is 
considerable.
Table 3 Fixed effects models predicting SVP preference following three life 
events (separation, unemployment, health crisis)
 Separation Unemployment Health crisis
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Event 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.027** 0.028** 0.026* 0.027*
(3.2) (3.2) (2.4) (2.5) (1.7) (1.7)
Lowest income quintile –0.000 –0.000 –0.000
(–0.6) (–0.9) (–0.6)
Less social expenses 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(5.9)
(5.3)
(5.4)
More social expenses –0.003 –0.007** –0.006*
(–0.9) (–2.1) (–1.7)
Better chances for Swiss 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(4.9) (5.5) (5.3)
Job important for independence 0.001* 0.001 0.001
(1.7) (1.5) (1.4)
Children suffer with working 
mother
0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.0) (0.4) (0.3)
Trust in Government –0.001 –0.002** –0.002*
(–0.8) (–2.0) (–1.8)
Age 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(3.1) (2.3) (3.8) (3.0) (3.6) (2.7)
Election year 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(9.6) (9.6) (9.4) (9.5) (9.5) (9.5)
Constant 0.070*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.060***
(5.0) (4.2) (4.0) (3.9) (4.1) (3.9)
R-squared 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006
Number of persons 10 106 10 106 9 548 9 548 9 603 9 603
Number of observations 44 098 44 098 38 294 38 294 38 256 38 256
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Source: SHP (2002–2009, 2011, 2014, 2017). T-statistics in parentheses.
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We further interact the event variable with traditional explanations for right-wing 
support. We focus on the same variables (income, less social expenses, more social 
expenses, better chances for Swiss, job importance for independence, children suf-
fering with a working mother and trust in government) as in the previous models. 
For the interaction, we take the mean value before the occurrence of the event. With 
seven interaction variables and three events, we estimated 21 separate models. Only 
three models show a significant interaction term. Figure 1 shows the significant 
interaction terms. The full models for these graphs are shown in Table 4. 
Whereas we found no main effect of traditional gender values on SVP prefer-
ence, we found four significant interactions that moderate the effect of negative life 
events on SVP support. Following separation, especially individuals with traditional 
Table 4 Summary of fixed effects models predicting SVP support including 
interaction effects between event and income, attitudes, and  
political trust (separate model for each interaction)
Separation Unemployment Health crisis
Coef. t Coef. t Coef. t
Event 0.034* (1.7) –0.036 (1.3)  .041**  (2.3)
Event* Income  
percentile –0.000 (–0.5) 0.001** (2.4) –0.104 (–1.6) 
Event 0.027** (2.3) 0 .011 (0.6) 0.047*   (1.8)
Event * More social expenses –0.004 (–0.2)  0.032  (1.1) –0.041    (–1.0) 
Event 0.032*** (3.5) 0.032**   (2.5)   0.009   (0.5)
Event * Less social expenses –0.038 (1.5)  –0.034   (–0.8)  0.101  (1.7) 
Event 0.031*** (3.2)  –0.039***   (2.7) 0.008  (0.4)  
Event*Better chances for Swiss –0.021 (1.0)   –0.040  (–1.3)   0.055   (1.3)
Event 0.133***  (3.7)  0.047   (1.1) 0.036  (0.6)
Event*Job important for  
independence –0.013***  (-3.1)   –0.003  (–0.5)   –0.001   (0.1)
Event –0.013 (-0.8) 0 .060  (2.2)  0.002  (0.1)  
Event*Children suffer with  
working mother 0.007  (2.5)  –0.006  (–1.3)  0.004    (0.8)  
Event 0.002  (0.1)  0.058*  (1.8) 0.037   0.87 
Event* Trust in Government 0.004  (1.1)   –0.006  (–1.0)  –0.002  (–0.3)
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10; Source: SHP (2002-2009, 2011, 2014, 2017). T-statistics in parentheses.
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gender role values seem to switch to the SVP. Individuals who agree that pre-school 
children suffer with a working mother increase their SVP support after a separation. 
The same holds for individuals who disagree that a job is important for independence 
for a woman as for a man (see Figure 1). Thus, separation has the strongest effect 
on those who share the traditional family values of the SVP prior to the event. It is 
interesting that gender attitudes prior to the event matter, whereas main determinants 
of radical right voting such as anti-EU sentiments and xenophobic attitudes do not. 
We also found a significant interaction between unemployment and income, 
although at a lower significance level. Individuals with higher income prior to 
unemployment are more likely to support the SVP following unemployment than 
individuals with lower income. This is contrary to our expectation that especially 
individuals with fewer financial resources would be more likely to prefer the SVP 
following a critical life event. Perhaps the financial consequences of unemployment 
are larger for individuals with a higher income, as they may experience a larger drop 
in income when they rely on unemployment benefits. Alternatively, the higher 
dependency of poorer individuals on financial support by the government could 
limit their support for the SVP in case of a job loss either due to unemployment 
or for health reasons.
Figure 1 Predicted probability to support SVP following negative events for 
different values of the gender variables and income levels
Separation: child suffers with working mother
–.05 0 .05 .1
10
5
0
Change SVP vote
Unemployment: income percentile
–.1 –.05 0 .05 .1
100
50
0
Change SVP vote
Separation: job importance for independence
0 .05 .1 .2.15
10
5
0
Change SVP vote
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5 Conclusion
This study set out to assess the relationship between critical life events and populist 
radical right support. We examined the extent to which individuals experiencing 
relationship dissolution, unemployment or a health crisis change their party pref-
erence to the SVP and tested whether changes in attitudes, resources and political 
trust would explain changes in party preference. We found that the experience of 
all three critical life events increased the likelihood of supporting the SVP by 2 to 
3 per cent. This shows that experiencing life course events has consequences for 
intended voting behaviour. On one side, this insight adds to our understanding of 
the sometimes far-reaching consequences of critical life course events, showing that 
they go beyond direct consequences for the individual involved, and reach the politi-
cal domain, with potential consequences for society in terms of election outcomes. 
On the other side, it sheds light on potential drivers of volatility in political party 
preference and support for the populist radical right. People’s party preference is 
not only determined by social class, the state of the economy or electoral campaigns 
(Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Oesch 2008) but also by significant events that take 
place in citizens’ personal lives. Moreover, we demonstrate that with respect to sup-
port for the SVP, in a fixed-effects model, the experience of these critical life events 
is as important as changes in well-known cultural determinants such as xenophobia. 
Whereas our study showed that support for the SVP increases following 
relationship dissolution, unemployment or a health crisis, we were less successful 
in demonstrating why this happens. We explored conventional explanations for 
populist radical right support as potential drivers of the effect, expecting that life 
course events affect financial resources and may lead to more conservative attitudes, 
more extreme attitudes and a worse relation to politics. We found that although 
they were important for predicting a preference for the SVP, they did not explain 
why relationship dissolution and unemployment increase SVP support. Whereas 
studies have shown that critical events in the life course may change attitudes 
(Bardi et al. 2009), they are not necessarily affected in the same way for everyone. 
Randles and colleagues (2017) found that following life events, existing attitudes 
became more polarized. Moreover, the way in which life events affect attitudes may 
depend on the attitudes prior to the occurrence of the event, which paints a more 
complex picture than the hypothesized same direction of change for all. We found 
limited empirical support for this assertion. In most cases, the effect of critical life 
events on a preference for the SVP was not more pronounced for individuals who 
were closer aligned with the views of the SVP prior to the event. There were only 
two exceptions to this. Individuals with a higher income were more likely to prefer 
the SVP following unemployment, and individuals with more traditional gender 
attitudes were more likely to shift to the SVP following separation. It may be that 
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the experience of separation make gender values more salient as they touch most 
directly on the private sphere. 
The extent to which our findings are valid in another context than Switzerland 
remains to be explored. The Swiss context is particular not only with respect to the 
political landscape but also with respect to the consequences of these critical life 
events. For example, factors such as high divorce rates and low unemployment rates 
may affect how people experience these events. Also, social policies such as universal 
health care and generous unemployment benefits soften the negative consequences. 
It would be interesting to see to what extent our findings hold elsewhere. 
More work is needed to shed light on the ways in which critical life events 
shape support for the SVP and change political attitudes and party preferences in 
general. When it comes to populist radical right support and support for any other 
political party, the considerations that lead to supporting a party are not only rational 
in nature but also have an emotional component (Hochschild, 2016). Critical life 
events may produce uncertainty in a person’s life, they may also increase uncertainty 
about one’s identity (Hogg, 2014). Insofar as a populist right wing party offers such 
a social identity, this may drive increased support following the experience of critical 
life events. Whereas our data did not allow us to test such a theory, the importance 
of a threatened identity for populist radical right support has received empirical 
support in the US context (Hochschild, 2016). 
Our study had several limitations. The most notable one is the limited number 
of events occurring in the data as well as that the SVP is underrepresented in the 
SHP. It would be wise to expand this research to include other household panels 
as a way to augment the number of event occurrences to analyse, as well as to see 
to what extent our findings are valid in contexts outside of Switzerland. Also, we 
measured vote intentions, but this may not translate directly into actual voting be-
haviour. Finally, our analysis relies on the assumption that selection into life events 
is not driven by changing party support or attitudes. Generally, we do not think 
this assumption is very problematic as it is unlikely that political views influence 
health, unemployment or separation. Overcoming these limitations, we encourage 
future studies to further explore the consequences of what happens in individual 
life courses for political and other societal outcomes. 
6 References
Aarts, Kees, and Jacques Thomassen. 2008. Dutch Voters and the Changing Party Space 1989-2006. 
Acta politica 42(2/3): 203–234.
Ackermann, Kathrin, Eros Zampieri, and Markus Freitag. 2018. Personality and Voting for a Right-
Wing Populist Party - Evidence from Switzerland. Swiss Political Science Review 24(4): 545–564.
Amengay, Abdelkarim, and Daniel Stockemer. 2018. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Meta-
Analysis of Structural Factors. Political Studies Review 17(1): 30–40. 
(When) Do Critical Life Events Push People to the Populist Radical Right? 531
SJS 46 (3), 2020, 515–533
Andersen, Robert, and Josh Curtis. 2015. Social Class, Economic Inequality, and the Convergence of 
Policy Preferences: Evidence from 24 Modern Democracies. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue 
canadienne de sociologie 52: 266–288. 
Arzheimer, Kai. 2011. Electoral Sociology - Who Votes for the Extreme Right and Why - and When? 
Pp. 35–50 in The Extreme Right in Europe: Current Trends and Perspectives edited by Uwe Backes 
and Patrick Moreau. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Arzheimer, Kai. 2018. Explaining electoral support for the radical right. Pp. 143–165 in The Oxford 
Handbook of the Radical Right edited by Jens Rydgren. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Bardi, Anat, Julie Anne Lee, Nadi Hofmann-Towfigh, and Geoffrey Soutar. 2009. The Structure of 
Intraindividual Value Change. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97(5): 913–929.
Batavia, Andrew I., and Richard L. Beaulaurier. 2001. The Financial Vulnerability of People with Dis-
abilities: Assessing Poverty Risks. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 28(1): 139–162.
Bernhard, Laurent. 2017. Three Faces of Populism in Current Switzerland: Comparing the Populist 
Communication of the Swiss People’s Party, the Ticino League, and the Geneva Citizens’ Move-
ment. Swiss Political Science Review 23(4): 509–525.
Betz, Hand-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London: Macmillan. 
Betz, Hans-Georg. 2005. Against the System: Radical Right-Wing Populism’s Challenge to Liberal De-
mocracy. Pp 25–40 in Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the Western world, 
edited by Jens Rydgren. Hauppage, New-York: Nova Science Publishers. 
Billiet, Jaak, and Hans de Witte. 1995. Attitudinal Dispositions to Vote for a ‘New’ Extreme Right-
Wing Party: The Case of ‘Vlaams Blok’. European Journal of Political Research 27(2): 181–202. 
Bjørklund, Tor. 2007. Unemployment and the Radical Right in Scandinavia: Beneficial or Non-Beneficial 
for Electoral Support? Comparative European Politics 5(3): 245–263. 
Bornschier, Simon, and Hanspeter Kriesi. 2012. The Populist Right, the Working Class, and the Changing 
Face of Class Politics. Abingdon and New York: Routledge. 
Brand, Jennie E. 2015. The Far-Reaching Impact of Job Loss and Unemployment. Annual Review of 
Sociology 41(1): 359–375. 
Chapman, Jenny. 1985. Marital Status, Sex and the Formation of Political Attitudes in Adult Life. 
Political Studies 33(4): 592–609.
Corbetta, Piergiorgio, and Pasquale Colloca. 2013. Job Precariousness and Political Orientations: The 
Case of Italy. South European Society and Politics 18(3): 333–354. 
Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. The Politics of Resentment. Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of 
Scott Walker. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Dalton, Russel J., and Steven A. Weldon. 2005. Public Images of Political Parties: A Necessary Evil? West 
European Politics 28(5): 931–951.
Dassonneville, Ruth. 2012. Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy: A Study 
on Changes in Voter Preferences During the Belgian Regional Elections of 2009. Acta Politica 
47(1): 18–41.
Duina, Francesco, and Dylan Carson. 2019. Not So Right After All? Making Sense of the Progressive 
Rhetoric of Europe’s Far-Right Parties. International Sociology 35(1): 3–21. 
Fahs, Breanne. 2007. Second Shifts and Political Awakenings. Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 47(3/4): 
43–66.
Geishecker, Ingo, and Thomas Siedler. 2011. Job Loss Fears and (Extreme) Party Identification: First 
Evidence From Panel Data. CEGE Discussion Papers 129. Göttingen: Georg-August-Universität 
Göttingen. 
Hatemi, Peter K. 2013. The Influence of Major Life Events on Economic Attitudes in World of Gene-En-
vironment Interplay. American Journal of Political Science 57(4): 987–1007.
532 Marieke Voorpostel, Ursina Kuhn, and Gian-Andrea Monsch
SJS 46 (3), 2020, 515–533
Heine, Steven J., Travis Proulx, and Kathleen D. Vohs. 2006. The Meaning Maintenance Model: On 
the Coherence of Social Motivations. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10(2): 88–110. 
Hochschild, Arlie R. 2016. Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right. 
New York: The New Press.
Hogg, Michael A. 2014. From Uncertainty to Extremism: Social Categorization and Identity Processes. 
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23(5): 338–342.
Hooghe, Marc, Sofie Marien, and Teun Pauwels. 2011. Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There is No 
Viable Exist or Voice Option? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in the Belgian 
Regional Elections of June 2009. Government and Opposition 46(2): 245–273.
Janoff-Bulman, Ronnie. 1999. Rebuilding Shattered Assumptions After Traumatic Life Events: Coping 
Processes and Outcomes. Pp. 305–323 in Coping: The Psychology of What Works, edited by C.R. 
Snyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J. McGann. 1995. The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative 
Analysis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Kern, Holger L. 2010. The Political Consequences of Transitions Out Of Marriage in Great Britain. 
Electoral Studies 29(2): 249–258.
Kohler, Ulrich. 2002. Changing Class Locations and Partisanship in Germany. Pp. 117–31 in The Social 
Logic of Politics. Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior, edited by Alan S. Zuckerman. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Kuhn, Ursina. 2009. Stability and Change in Party Preferences. Swiss Political Science Review 15 (3): 
463–494.
Kuhn, Ursina. 2016. Dynamics of Party Preferences: A Study on the Volatility and Stability of Individuals 
Using Household Panel Data from Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland. University of Zurich. 
http://opac.nebis.ch/ediss/20162715.pdf.
Lubbers, Marcel and Marcel Coenders. 2017. National Attitudes and Voting for the Radical Right in 
Europe. European Union Politics 18(1): 98–118. 
Luhmann, Maike, Wilhelm Hofmann, Michael Eid, and Richard E. Lucas. 2012. Subjective Well-Being 
and Adaptation to Life Events: A Meta-Analysis on Differences Between Cognitive and Affective 
Well-Being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102(3): 592–615.
McGann, Anthony J., and Herbert Kitschelt. 2005. The Radical Right in the Alps: Evolution of Support 
for the Swiss SVP and Austrian FPÖ. Party Politics 11(2): 147–171. 
Mudde, Cas. 2007. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nicolet, Sarah, and Pascal Sciarini. 2006. When Do Issue Opinions Matter, and to Whom? The Deter-
minants of Long-Term Stability and Change in Party Choice in the 2003 Swiss Elections. Swiss 
Political Science Review 12(4): 159–90.
Oesch, Daniel. 2008. Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: 
Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. International Political Science 
Review 29(3): 349–373.
Plutzer, Eric. 2002. Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood. 
American Political Science Review 96(1): 41–56.
Prior, Markus. 2010. You’ve Either Got It or You Don’t? The Stability of Interest Over the Life Cycle. 
Journal of Politics 72(3): 747–766.
Randles, Daniel, Steven J. Heine, Michael Poulin, and Roxane Cohen Silver. 2017. Experienced Adver-
sity in Life is Associated with Polarized and Affirmed Political Attitudes. Social Psychology and 
Personality Science 8(6): 652–659.
Rink, Nathalie, Karen Phalet, and Marc Swyngedouw. 2008. The Effects of Immigrant Population 
Size, Unemployment, and Individual Characteristics on Voting for the Vlaams Blok in Flanders 
1991–1999. European Sociological Review 25(4): 411–424. 
(When) Do Critical Life Events Push People to the Populist Radical Right? 533
SJS 46 (3), 2020, 515–533
Rydgren, Jens. 2007. The Sociology of the Radical Right. Annual Review of Sociology 33: 241–262.
Sanders, David, and Malcolm Brynin. 1999. The Dynamics of Party Preference Change in Britain, 
1991–1996. Political Studies 47: 219–239. 
Salmela, Mikko, and Christian Von Scheve. 2017. Emotional Roots of Right-Wing Political Populism. 
Social Science Information 56(4): 567–595.
Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger, Stefan Weick, and Bernhard Christoph. 2006. Shaky Attachments: Individu-
al-Level Stability and Change of Partisanship among West German Voters, 1984-2001. European 
Journal of Political Research 45: 581–608.
Schofield, Deborah J., Richard Percival, Megan E. Passey, Rupendra N. Shrestha, Emily J. Callander, 
and Simon J. Kelly. 2010. The Financial Vulnerability of Individuals with Diabetes. The British 
Journal of Diabetes & Vascular Disease 10(6): 300–304. 
Schraff, Dominik. 2019. Politically Alienated Through Low-Wage Work? Evidence from Panel Data. 
Swiss Political Science Review 25(1): 19–39.
Schur, Lisa, and Meera Adya. 2013. Sidelined or Mainstreamed? Political Participation and Attitudes of 
People with Disabilities in the United States. Social Science Quarterly 94(3): 811–839.
Smith, Tom W. 2007. Changes in Family Structure, Family Values, and Politics, 1972-2006. GSS Social 
Change Report 53. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. 
Van der Meer, Tom W., Erika van Elsas, Rozemarijn Lubbe, and Wouter van der Brug. 2015. Are Vola-
tile Voters Erratic, Whimsical or Seriously Picky? A Panel Study of 58 Waves into the Nature of 
Electoral Volatility (The Netherlands 2006–2010). Party Politics 21(1): 100–114. 
Vaus, David, Matthew Gray, Lixia Qu, and David Stanton. 2017. The Economic Consequences of Divorce 
in Six OECD Countries. Australian Journal of Social Issues 52(2): 180–199.
Voorpostel, Marieke, and Hilde Coffé. 2012. Transitions in partnership and parental status, gender, and 
political and civic participation. European Sociological Review 28(1): 28-42.
Voorpostel, Marieke, Hilde Coffe, and Ursina Kuhn. 2018. The Link between Separation and Political 
Party Preference: Selectivity or Causal Influence? Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties.
Wilson, J.Matthew, and Michael Lusztig. 2004. The Spouse in the House: What Explains the Marriage 
Gap in Canada? Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 
37(4): 979–995.
